

CENTRAL SECURITIES CORPORATION PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES

Central Securities Corporation is involved in many matters of corporate governance through the proxy voting process. We exercise our voting responsibilities with the primary goal of maximizing the long-term value of our investments. Our consideration of proxy issues is focused on the investment implications of each proposal.

Our management evaluates and votes each proxy ballot that we receive. We do not use a proxy voting service. Our Board of Directors has approved guidelines in evaluating how to vote a particular proxy ballot. We recognize that a company's management is entrusted with the day-to-day operations of the company, as well as longer term strategic planning, subject to the oversight of the company's board of directors. Our guidelines are based on the belief that a company's shareholders have a responsibility to evaluate company performance and to exercise the rights and duties pertaining to ownership.

When determining whether to invest in a particular company, one of the key factors we consider is the ability and integrity of its management. As a result, we believe that recommendations of management on any issue, particularly routine issues, should be given substantial weight in determining how proxies should be voted. Thus, on most issues, our votes are cast in accordance with the company's recommendations. When we believe management's recommendation is not in the best interests of our stockholders, we will vote against management's recommendation.

Due to the nature of our business and our size, it is unlikely that conflicts of interest will arise in our voting of proxies of public companies. We do not engage in investment banking nor do we have private advisory clients or any other businesses. In the unlikely event that we determine that a conflict does arise on a proxy voting issue, we will defer that proxy vote to our independent directors.

We have listed the following, specific examples of voting decisions for the types of proposals that are frequently presented. We generally vote according to these guidelines. We may, on occasion, vote otherwise when we believe it to be in the best interest of our stockholders:

Election of Directors – We believe that good governance starts with an independent board, unfettered by significant ties to management, in which all members are elected annually. In addition, key board committees should be entirely independent.

- We support the election of directors that result in a board made up of a majority of independent directors who do not appear to have been remiss in the performance of their oversight responsibilities.
- We will withhold votes for non-independent directors who serve on the audit, compensation or nominating committees of the board.
- We consider withholding votes for directors who missed more than one-fourth of the scheduled board meetings without good reason in the previous year.

- We generally oppose the establishment of classified boards of directors and will support proposals that directors stand for election annually.
- We generally oppose limits to the tenure of directors or requirements that candidates for directorships own large amounts of stock before being eligible for election.

Compensation - We believe that appropriately designed equity-based compensation plans can be an effective way to align the interests of long-term shareholders and the interests of management, employees, and directors. We are opposed to plans that substantially dilute our ownership interest in the company, provide participants with excessive awards, or have inherently objectionable structural features without offsetting advantages to the company's stockholders. We evaluate proposals related to compensation on a case-by case basis.

- We generally support stock option plans that are incentive based and not excessive.
- We generally oppose the ability to re-price options without compensating factors when the underlying stock has fallen in value.
- We support measures intended to increase the long-term stock ownership by executives including requiring stock acquired through option exercise to be held for a substantial period of time.
- We generally support stock purchase plans to increase company stock ownership by employees, provided that shares purchased under the plan are acquired for not less than 85% of their market value.
- We generally oppose change-in-control provisions in non-salary compensation plans, employment contracts, and severance agreements which benefit management and would be costly to shareholders if triggered.

Corporate Structure and Shareholder Rights - We generally oppose anti-takeover measures and other proposals designed to limit the ability of shareholders to act on possible transactions. We support proposals when management can demonstrate that there are sound financial or business reasons.

- We generally support proposals to remove super-majority voting requirements and oppose amendments to bylaws which would require a super-majority of shareholder votes to pass or repeal certain provisions.
- We will evaluate proposals regarding shareholders rights plans ("poison pills") on a case-by-case basis considering issues such as the term of the arrangement and the level of review by independent directors.
- We will review proposals for changes in corporate structure such as changes in the state of incorporation or mergers individually. We generally oppose proposals where management does not offer an appropriate rationale.
- We generally support share repurchase programs.
- We generally support the general updating of or corrective amendments to corporate charters and by-laws.
- We generally oppose the elimination of the rights of shareholders to call special meetings.

Approval of Independent Auditors – We believe that the relationship between the company and its auditors should be limited primarily to the audit engagement and closely related activities that do not, in the aggregate, raise the appearance of impaired independence.

- We generally support management’s proposals regarding the approval of independent auditors.
- We evaluate on a case-by-case basis instances in which the audit firm appears to have a substantial non-audit relationship with the company or companies affiliated with it.

Social and Corporate Responsibility Issues - We believe that ordinary business matters are primarily the responsibility of management and should be approved solely by the corporation’s board of directors. Proposals in this category, initiated primarily by shareholders, typically request that the company disclose or amend certain business practices. We generally vote with management on these types of proposals, although we may make exceptions in certain instances where we believe a proposal has substantial economic implications.

- We generally oppose shareholder proposals which apply restrictions related to social, political, or special interest issues which affect the ability of the company to do business or be competitive and which have significant financial impact.
- We generally oppose proposals which require that the company provide costly, duplicative, or redundant reports, or reports of a non-business nature.